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Hopes for the future are slim. Rather than pushing
forward with con¢dence that we know the way, we
see the growing failure of the most visible alterna-
tives, which all seem profoundly £awed.. . .
Alvin Gouldner,The Dark Side of the Dialectic 2
China now confronts the most massive scale of unemployment and
peasant labor migration in the history of the People's Republic. This is
a potentially volatile time, marked by soaring numbers of labor dis-
putes, petitions, and protests, prompting the regime to warn unambigu-
ously of ``new internal contradictions among the people.''3 Yet, so far,
Communist rule has endured without e¡ective popular challenge. A
most intriguing paradox of the Chinese reform is thus the regime's
capacity to maintain overall social stability, while market socialism
has also intensi¢ed labor discontents and radicalized labor activism.
This article unravels this paradox by proposing a thesis of `̀ postsocial-
ist labor insurgency.'' My overall argument is that the transition from
state socialism to market socialism occasions a simultaneous radical-
ization of worker politics and the state's attempt to bolster its regula-
tory capacity by institutionalizing a `̀ rule by law.'' Both tendencies, as I
explicate below, have to do with the multi-faceted consequences of
introducing a market economy. The precarious balance between labor
activism and its partial incorporation4 by this regulatory regime ac-
counts for current political stability. So far, only some workers are
involved in such activism, while many are demoralized and atomized
in the wake of massive unemployment. However statistically unrepre-
sentative, labor insurgency in speci¢c locales remains theoretically
signi¢cant in that it constitutes a ``critical case,'' capable of £eshing out
the dynamics, the limits, and hence also the potentials of worker
politics in a period of structural transformation. History has shown
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that reform in China has always been the harbinger of revolutionary
changes. The political consequences of reform may well depend on
whether class con£icts, among other types of social con£icts, can in
the long run be contained within the £edgling system of ``socialist
legality,'' in a polity with a widening rift between central and local state
power, and in a society rife with a contradictions between entrenched
socialist rhetoric and emergent capitalist realities.
Revolutionary potential of socialist labor
One of the most provocative theoretical postulations on socialist work-
ing-class radicalism and its fate under reform is found in Michael
Burawoy and Janos Lukacs'sThe Radiant Past.5 State socialism, rather
than capitalism, they argue, is more conducive to the making of a
revolutionary working class in favor of workers' socialism. The institu-
tional foundation nurturing such potentials is the state socialist regime
of production, predicated on the shortage economy and the state
apparatus inside the enterprise. The shortage economy creates con-
stant need for worker autonomy to overcome anarchy in production,
while the party-state apparatus at the point of production renders
transparent the extraction of surplus and therefore a common class
exploiter. These conditions forge labor's critical consciousness, encom-
passing, on the one hand, a negative immanent critique of state social-
ism for its failure to live up to its claims of superior e¤ciency and
equality, and, on the other hand, a positive vision for an alternative
order based on worker self-management. Market reform, Burawoy and
Lukacs further contend, has the tendency to pacify working-class
radicalism by providing alternative channels of mobility based on
individual rather than group e¡ort. The contrast in working-class
movements in Poland and Hungary highlights how in Poland the lack
of market opportunity and the presence of civil society organizations
combined to make for Solidarity's revolt against the state. In Hungary,
on the other hand, workers were politically demobilized after the failed
1956 revolt and instead invested their energy in exploiting entrepre-
neurial opportunities in the second economy. If the above argument
can be summarized as the ``revolutionary socialist working-class''
thesis, the Chinese experience analyzed in this article reveals anoma-
lies that compel its reconstruction into what can be called an ``in-
surgent postsocialist labor'' thesis. Both theses are concerned with
the e¡ect of the lived experience of state socialism and market reform
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on worker radicalization in terms of class consciousness and class
capacity.
The insurgent worker of postsocialism
The `̀ insurgent postsocialist labor'' thesis argues that the passage of
state socialism is prone to trigger labor insurgency because market
reform seriously compromises working-class interests and throws into
sharp relief the lost potentials of socialism. Postsocialism, not state
socialism, is the moment of labor radicalization.There are four aspects
of change involved. First, against the original postulation that the lived
experience of socialism is generative of oppositional class conscious-
ness, I argue that workers' socialist experience is a necessary but not
su¤cient condition for its formation. Critical class consciousness
emerges only under, and not prior to, market reform. The Chinese
experience seems to suggest that there are variants of `̀ socialist regime
of production'' and that socialist production per se is not necessarily
conducive to the kind of inherent critique, even antagonism, of social-
ism found in Eastern Europe or Russia. The Chinese regime of pro-
duction was con¢gured di¡erently: Rather than anarchic production
requiring worker autonomy and improvisation, the emphasis was al-
ways on political activism and mobilizational production campaigns
under party control in the workplace, which pre-empted worker con-
trol or self-management.6 Only when economic reform ushers in the
exploitative forces of the market, reconstitutes shop-£oor production
relations, and incites class con£icts do workers activate the cognitive
resources buried in received socialist ideology and rhetoric. Then, and
only then, do these cultural repertoires make experiential sense and
lead to a collective conceptual achievement of `̀ class.'' The reconstitu-
tion of the material, political, and ideological moments of production
occurs in the crucible of a new regime of production. In China, what I
call ``disorganized despotism'' has emerged under reform to replace the
former ``neo-traditional'' system.
Second, the impact of market reform on mobilization, rather than
always negative as the original thesis suggests, is actually more varied.
It is true that market opportunity dissipates collective mobilization ^
labor protests and demonstrations in China are more concentrated in
the northeast and the interior provinces than in the more prosperous
south. Nevertheless, market reform can be conducive to mobilization,
even without civil society or social movement organizations, if its
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uneven development produces collective losers and frees them from
state or enterprise control. Where the political and organizational
resources necessary for class-speci¢c social movements, cross-class
alliances, or civil society associations are not available, insurgent
mobilization can still be built on the organizational ruins of state
socialism. Chinese workers in bankrupt enterprises or in the rust belt
regions, who were previously organized by state socialism into work
units, now engage in work-unit activism, the predominant mode of
mobilization.
The third argument concerns workers' vision of an alternative social
order and labor subjectivity. Instead of workers' socialism, Chinese
workers'alternative society is not a total repudiation of state socialism.
Rather, it is a social order where the state assumes responsibility for
guaranteeing a minimum level of general welfare and plays a pivotal
role in instituting and enforcing the rules of the market economy,
which is deemed necessary to provide the freedom, opportunity, and
dynamism lacking in a planned economy. Again, this positive vision of
the state and its role has to do with workers' past experience with state
paternalism, the intertwined history of state making and class making
after the 1949 Revolution, and the sustained political dominance of the
party-state in the reform period. I show here that the subject of Chi-
nese labor insurgency has a strong statist orientation, while also being
`̀ interpellated'' by the state's ideological categories of class, comrade,
and citizen.
Finally, the state undergoes self-transformation in the reform process.
Instead of focusing on the role of the state in production and redistribu-
tion, I ¢nd a recon¢guration of state capacity in the realm of regula-
tion. `̀ Rule by law'' is a new statecraft under one party rule and market
liberalization. Although it is still a work in progress, the rudimentary
ideology and apparatus of ``socialist legality'' do have the e¡ect of
inciting new forms of popular resistance riding on the call for legality
and rights. But `̀ rule by law'' is an instrument of a repressive state, not
tantamount to a ``rule of law'' capable of restraining the state.Workers'
seizure of the rights rhetoric ironically means that their activism is at
least partially channeled into, and restrained by, the state's new regu-
latory machinery and its discourse of legality.
A word about what I mean by ``insurgency'' and `̀ postsocialism'' is in
order. The `̀ revolutionary'' potentials Burawoy and Lukacs ¢nd under
state socialism refer to workers' opposition to state socialism and their
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espousal of a Marxian utopia, i.e., classless communism or workers'
socialism. But workers' political aspirations and sensibilities are more
wide-ranging and the notion of `̀ insurgency'' is used here because it is
more open and less teleological in terms of workers' goals of struggle.
It allows for politics outside the problematic of emancipation. It also
better captures the ``ambivalent'' 7 terrain of politics rooted in en-
trenched dependence of the subaltern classes on a repressive state, a
condition generating orientations of both entrapment and solidarity
with the dominant power. Thus, following Guha, `̀ insurgency'' is ``the
site where two mutually contradictory tendencies . . . ^ a conservative
tendency made up of the inherited and uncritically absorbed material
of the ruling culture and a radical one oriented towards a practical
transformation of the rebel's conditions of existence ^ met for a deci-
sive trial of strength.'' 8 Finally, `̀ postsocialism'' refers to a historical
condition in which (1) the centrally planned economy no longer plays a
predominant role in the production and redistribution of resources;9
(2) and when the socialist state perceives a need to articulate ``actually
existing socialism'' to capitalism, conditioned both by the structure of
the former and an avowed attempt to overcome the de¢ciency of the
latter.10
Fieldwork, comparison, and argument
Fieldwork for this research began in late 1995, the year when labor
contract was implemented for the ¢rst time since 1949. The next ¢ve
years of factory visits and worker interviews coincided with a period of
rapid deterioration in labor-management relation. Unemployment ¢g-
ures have also soared to historic heights, leaping from 7 million in 1993
to 20 million in 1999. An annual addition of three to four million to the
ranks of the unemployed over the next several years has been predicted
by the government.11 Incidents of strikes and worker protests, hovering
around three to four thousand every year since the mid-1990s, became
widespread, especially in interior and northeastern provinces.12 The
postsocialist labor insurgency thesis is formulated with this trend in
mind. The most restive workers are those in loss-making or bankrupt
state-owned enterprises, which account for some 50 percent of all state
¢rms nationwide. Fieldwork is thus focused primarily on these workers
in traditional, labor intensive, low technology and mass production
manufacturing in the state sector, or those who bear the brunt of
socialism's retreat.13 For comparative purposes, especially for illustrat-
ing the e¡ect of the historical experience of state socialism, I also
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include migrant workers in both state and non-state ¢rms in the study.
Born in the post-Mao era, these migrant workers respond di¡erently to
market reform than veteran state workers who came of age under
Maoist socialism. In terms of regional economy, ¢eld data include
materials from both Guangdong in the prosperous south and Liaoning
in the rust belt in northeastern China. Since the focus here is on labor
activism, I concentrate on the case of Liaoning and make occasional
references to Guangdong only when they help to highlight the speci¢c-
ity of the northeast.
This article speci¢es the concrete social processes and institutional
mechanisms out of which labor insurgency emerges under market re-
form. The transformation of labor system and worker life-worlds en-
tails the mutually determining interplay among the state, the shop
£oor, and workers' political agency, each of which will be taken up in
the following discussion. The ¢rst part looks at the new institutional
apparatus of state domination over labor after the decline of the
planned economy and the weakening of the organizational capacity of
the party-state. I examine the Chinese state's attempts to forge a new
basis for legitimacy based on a so-called ``socialist legality'' and the
staunch resistance at the local level this has triggered. Local state
agents and enterprise management share common interests in evading
labor law and regulations, resulting in a regime of ``disorganized des-
potism,'' as discussed in the second part. It is characterized on the shop
£oor by the ascendance of ``scienti¢c management,'' despotic discipli-
nary practices, and the demise of the party and the union inside the
enterprise. Despotism constitutes worker interests in opposition to
management and incites critical class consciousness. This brings me to
the third part of the analysis, which turns to labor insurgency and
subjectivity as these emerge out of the gap between the state project of
socialist legality and the reality of disorganized despotism. Labor in-
surgency takes the form of ``work-unit mobilization,'' facilitated by the
organizational and identity resources bequeathed by state socialism.
Labor subjectivity is characterized by a double consciousness of class
and citizenship. The former is fostered by worker's community of
memories, focusing on the rhetoric and practices of Maoist socialism,
and the latter is an unintended consequence of the new state discourse
of legality and citizen rights.
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The state project of ``rule by law''
Recent scholarship has advanced a powerful case for the eclipse of the
Chinese party-state as a consequence of the dismantling of the com-
mand economy. Departures from central planning, these studies argue,
lead to the decline of scarcity-based organized dependence, the weak-
ening of the central authority's sanctioning and monitoring capacity
over local o¤cials, and of local o¤cials over citizens and social
groups.14 Although the aggregate growth or decline of state power
remains a contested empirical issue,15 I want to highlight the apparent
tendency of the Chinese state to bolster its regulatory power, even as it
relinquishes control over production and redistribution.
China's transition from a Maoist mobilizational state to a regulatory
state has been understood as a necessary accompaniment to the institu-
tionalizing of a socialist market economy. Since economic reform began,
laws and regulations have been used to specify a new framework of
property rights, to enforce contracts and to organize new market
structure.16 But Chinese leaders have been equally insistent on the
law's political function for maintaining social stability. The President
of the People's Republic Jiang Zemin remarked, ``Whether it is market
regulation or macro-economic regulation and control by the state, we
should constantly sum up our experiences and gradually incorporate
them into the law.We cannot possibly foster good order in the socialist
market economy in the absence of a sound socialist legal system.'' 17
A ``public order crisis'' of rising rates of crimes and disturbances
during the reform decades has aggravated the leadership's concern for
stability.18
Legalization of labor relations and implementation of new social pol-
icies targeting labor take place amidst this system shift toward a
regulatory state exhorting ``socialist legality'' and in a period of explo-
sive growth in law-making activities in general. ``Ruling the country by
law'' (yifazhiguo) has been formally incorporated into Article 5 of the
Constitution in 1999 and has become part of o¤cial lexicon now
widely adopted in government, legislature, and party reports. Notwith-
standing the fundamental di¡erence between a system of ``rule of law''
capable of restraining the party-state and the Chinese version of a
`̀ rule by law'' committed to the primacy of state power, a revitalization
of the legal system is evident.19 Between 1979^1998, some 327 laws
were enacted by the National People's Congress (the corresponding
¢gures were 7 and 122 for 1966^1978 and 1949^1965 respectively) and
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750 regulations were issued by the State Council.20 Beyond serving the
needs of economic reforms, these laws and regulations de¢ne rights
and interests of di¡erent social groups, and institutionalize the resolu-
tion of con£icts. Most consequential for the working class was the
promulgation of China's ¢rst Labor Law in 1995. A number of supple-
mentary laws and regulations have been passed or drafted, guiding
policies related to social insurance, labor safety, labor contract, collec-
tive contract, unemployment bene¢ts, and settlement of labor disputes,
etc.21
These laws and policies envision a sea change in the institutional
relation between state and labor. Instead of neo-traditional authority
exercised by the party apparatus within the enterprise through its
patron-client networks, employment practices and relations are now
to be regulated by an external bureaucratic system based on universal-
istic, abstract legal norms.Welfare, social services, and pension are to
be delivered through a centrally administered, societal-level safety net,
rather than workers' work units.Workers' personal passbooks record-
ing their insurance and social security funds accumulation symbolize
the severance of ties that bind their lives to particular employers. Life-
long employment privileges for some are eradicated while the intro-
duction of contract turns labor into a commodity in the marketplace
rather than a factor of production allocated by the state. Finally, by
issuing the `̀ Regulations on the Handling of Labor Disputes'' in 1993,
the government revives the national labor arbitration apparatus and
stipulates the legal procedures for local level arbitration and Civil
court litigation, allowing workers to bypass informal mediation at the
¢rm level. Therefore, instead of a general waning of the state's reach
and capacity, the important change is a shift in institutional emphasis.
The state has tried to impose a more legalistic and universalistic rela-
tion with the working class as a whole, without regard to enterprise
types and worker origins.Worker rights, control, and con£icts are to be
regulated within a uniform legal and policy framework.
As the next section shows, `̀ rule by law'' exists more as an ideological
discourse than an institutionalized reality. But one dialectical outcome
of this legalization project, however much it remains un¢nished, is the
popularization of the notion of rights. The o¤cial Workers' Daily
(Gongren Ribao) sums up the two decades of reform as an era of rights
(quanli) for workers. A veteran labor law scholar explains that
although the Party has always sought to protect labor rights, the means
to achieve this have shifted from administrative to legal ones in the
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reform era. The Labor Law codi¢es a panoply of legal rights and
interests for workers as contract-based, individualistic, industrial citi-
zens, and not as a collectivity of political subjects, the ``people'' or the
`̀ working-class.'' It incorporates workers into a market and contract-
driven system by conceding to them certain legal rights and interests.
At the same time, social policies about insurance contributions by
workers relegate to workers the individual responsibility for and invest-
ment in one's future, altering the past notion of state responsibility in
providing for a collective and communal safety net via the work units.
As I shall elaborate in a later section, the project of legalistic legitima-
tion has generated an idiom of legal rights as an emergent component
in the discursive repertoire used in labor struggle in China.Workers in
struggle take these laws seriously, more seriously than agents of the
local state whose collusion with the emerging bourgeois class often
results in evasion or violation of the law. The point here is that the
construction of a rule by law is a double-edged sword, in that it makes
hegemony as well as resistance.22 A cursory look at the aggregate rise
in the volume of arbitrated labor disputes, the most institutionalized
form of labor con£icts, is telling of the consequences of legalization.
The annual rate of increase in arbitrated disputes for the period 1994^
1999, following the 1993 Regulation on Handling Labor Disputes, was
54.5%, 73%, 45.7%, 48.6%, 31%, and 28.3%.23 In 1999 alone, there
were 120,191 cases, involving nearly a half-million workers.24 However,
statistics do not explain the constitution of worker interests and sub-
jectivity prompting this surge in activism. For these, we have to step
back into the hidden abode of market socialist production.
The rise of disorganized despotism and critical class consciousness
Production is one arena in which the state realizes its project of legal-
istic legitimation. The organization of the labor process and the polit-
ical institutions regulating struggles in the workplace, or what is called
a ``factory regime,'' powerfully shape working-class interests and ca-
pacity.25 Under Chinese reform, I have found a regime of `̀ disorganized
despotism.'' This is an ideal-typical concept that accentuates salient
and enduring elements in factory politics. Formulated on the basis of
observations across di¡erent types of industrial ¢rms under market
reform, and with reference to a comparative analytic of `̀ factory regime''
in general,26 the concept highlights the institutional consequences for
production when the mechanisms that have organized state socialism
begin to fall apart. Despite state e¡orts to institutionalize a legalistic
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regime, there is a lack of e¡ective coordination and implementation
among diverse reform measures. Such `̀ disorganized'' institutional
context allows for the emergence of managerial despotism inside the
enterprise. `̀ Despotism'' denotes three aspects of labor-management
relation: workers' institutional dependence on management for liveli-
hood, managerial power to impose coercive modes of labor control,
and workers' collective apprehension of such control as violations of
their interests and rights. My conjecture is that there is convergence
toward varying degrees of disorganized despotism across industrial
¢rms of di¡erent ownership types. This means that di¡erences ob-
served across ¢rm types and regions are contingent, not essential, and
can be explained by the same institutional con¢guration speci¢ed in
the concept. For instance, the generally longer working hours and
more intensive labor process in private ¢rms than in state ¢rms are due
more to the volume and nature of orders they respectively receive, not
due to any di¡erence in management's institutional power and its
imperative to impose discipline in these two types of ¢rm. There is
evidence to show that given the same kind of erratic production order,
state ¢rms are as prone to despotic management as their non-state
counterparts.27 One pivotal factor accounting for the despotic form of
production politics in Chinese factories has to do with the ubiquitous
oversupply of labor. When some 30 percent of both urban and rural
labor is considered `̀ surplus,'' 28 market reform is more likely to en-
hance managers' rather than workers' bargaining power. But there are
other institutional forces at work too.
Disorganized reform: Gaps in the societal safety net
The ¢rst condition contributing to despotism is reform's unintended
consequence of aggravating worker dependence on enterprise because
the new social security system is still very unevenly institutionalized.
National legislation has stipulated that enterprises of all ownership
types should participate in centralized schemes of old-age pensions,
medical care, maternity bene¢ts, unemployment, and industrial inju-
ries compensation funds. Pooling contributions from the local govern-
ment, the enterprise, and the individual employees, funds are to be
administered by local labor insurance departments. A society-wide
safety net is to be established in which a three-way contribution system
will guarantee the reproduction of labor power at a certain minimum
level independent of participation in production and of any single
employer. However, many of these funds have been operating in de¢-
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cits. The retirement pension fund in Guangdong, for instance, regis-
tered a 10 million yuan de¢cit in 1996. One important cause of this
shortfall in funds is that managers in loss-making state-owned enter-
prises, now accounting for more than 40 percent in Guangdong, sim-
ply refuse to use the enterprise wage bill to meet future or other ¢rm's
pay-outs. In Liaoning, where unemployment has reached an alarming
level of 40 percent among state workers, the state insurance apparatus
is paralyzed by insu¤cient funds. Between 1995^2000, the enterprise
contribution to unemployment funds is estimated to be 46 million
yuan, falling far behind the estimated 71.5 billion yuan needed for the
unemployed. In the provincial capital of Shenyang in 1998, 27 percent
of participating enterprises in pension funds stopped payment, creat-
ing a de¢cit of 240 million yuan. The local insurance bureau had to
borrow 110 million yuan from the municipal ¢nance and labor depart-
ments to make payment to retirees after waves of protests and public
demonstrations. Outside the state sector, compulsory participation in
social insurance is widely resisted by employers. Only 5.4 percent of
foreign-owned ¢rms, 3.2 percent village and township enterprises, and
0.3 percent of private and individual owned enterprises contribute to
Guangdong's pension funds. Finally, o¤cial abuse of funds in the form
of diversions and embezzlement is rampant. With this society-wide
safety net so £awed and unevenly realized, state-owned enterprise
workers see their long-term security once provided by enterprise pater-
nalism dismantled without viable alternative, and like their younger
counterparts in the non-state sectors, they are now vulnerable to total
dependence on wage employment for livelihood.29
Ascendance of managerial domination
In the reform blueprint, enhancement of managerial autonomy from
external bureaucratic superiors and from Party domination is to be
counterbalanced by a strengthened o¤cial union and the introduction
of labor contract, both of which would safeguard workers' interests
and rights. Again, like the social insurance reform, one ¢nds uneven
implementation of these inter-related measures as well as powerful
resistance from local o¤cials and managers.
Although the state sector is economically unsustainable and at the
edge of a monumental crisis, the fact remains that enterprise reform
has cumulated in factory directors' autonomy and autocratic power,
which ¢nds its most infamous manifestation in the widespread illicit
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asset stripping of state ¢rms, or the transfer of public property into
managers' private hands.30 Another concomitant development rein-
forcing managerial dominance is the demise of the Party and the union
inside state ¢rms. The role of the Party secretary, who used to be the
dominant partner in the triple alliance, has been rede¢ned to assist
management to enhance productivity, and therefore rendered subser-
vient to the director. One widely criticized practice indicative of the
marginal status of the Party at the ¢rm level is the concurrent appoint-
ment of managerial and party personnel. It has become extremely
common to ¢nd that the posts of party secretary and factory director
belong to the same person; or the factory director simultaneously
serves as deputy party secretary, and the party secretary wears the hat
of the deputy director.
Finally, the Chinese enterprise union su¡ers from further descent in
authority and in£uence in the actual operation of state factories. Despite
e¡orts by the All China Federation of Trade Unions at the central
government level to carve out more autonomy and legal power for
basic level unions through the passage of the 1992 Trade Union Law,
enterprise-level unions are handicapped by their dependence on enter-
prise for ¢nance and appointments of cadres. Union cadres inter-
viewed in both Guangdong and Liaoning mocked about losing their
own iron rice bowls now that enterprises are struggling to survive and
the Law de¢nes for them an impossible task of both promoting enter-
prise productivity and protecting worker rights and interests. Many
enterprises su¡er from ``starvation of meetings'' ^ unions and workers'
congresses have remained dormant for years, and union cadres, whose
formal existence is required by law, are cross-appointed from among
managerial personnel.31 The defunct enterprise union has rendered
many stipulations of the Labor Law, like the implementation of col-
lective contract between union and management, mere formalities.32
In non-state enterprises, `̀ disorganized despotism'' ¢nds even more
fertile soil. Managerial prerogatives are from the beginning unencum-
bered by these state socialist apparatuses. Local o¤cials, who bene¢t
collectively and individually from the management fees and taxation
levied from private and foreign ¢rms, have fostered a permissive regime
of labor regulation. The reciprocal need of investors for local o¤cial
patronage to bend central government regulation to their advantage
has given rise to what one sociologist has termed `̀ commercial clientel-
ism.'' 33 Such collusion is likely to persist with market reform as the
state expands its regulatory monopoly and state power becomes com-
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modi¢ed. A co-owner of a private knitting factory where migrant
workers toil standing up for 11 hours a day and can only take one day
o¡ every month on pay day, describes a common practice of evading
government regulation:
The set-up capital for this factory is 30,000 yuan, all private capital between
me and my partner. But o¤cially, it's a collective enterprise of the Hongshan
District government. If we register as private, we will have to deal with fees
and inspections from di¡erent departments. But now, we just pay the district
government a management fee and they take care of the tax bureau, com-
merce and industry department, labor bureau and workers' temporary resi-
dence permits. (Labor bureau?) No, they don't come.. . .(Insurance?) No, we
are not a state owned enterprise. But we have £u and cold medication in
the factory, and we give them herbal tea when the weather gets really
hot . . . .34
A labor lawyer in Guangdong o¡ers this telling episode that speaks
volumes about the extent of collusion between local governments and
non-state industrial capital,
At the end of a court hearing, the judge said to me in public, `̀ Lawyer Zhou,
if the court adheres to all the laws and regulations of the provincial govern-
ment, all these factories would move elsewhere and the local economy will
collapse. Who would be responsible then? You?'' He later on even stated
explicitly to my client that the two basic levels of the local courts in Dong-
guan City have reached a consensus that they could not follow the letter of
the law. Judges in the mainland are part of the local government, just like
o¤cials of the labor bureau. Their rice bowls depend on the income of the
local government and they in turn depend on private and foreign enter-
prises.35
For joint-venture ¢rms, the Chinese-side managers, usually local cadres,
are responsible for handling overbearing bureaucratic `̀ grannies.'' Even
when some larger factories comply with the law and sign one-year
labor contracts with migrant workers, and even set up an enterprise
union, these measures are mainly cosmetic. Having local cadres on the
management team shields the enterprise from external regulation,
especially when it comes to labor disciplines. Labor contracts, if signed
at all, are kept exclusively by the company, and workers often were not
given the chance to read through the terms of the contract.36 Infraction
of the Labor Law requirement for labor contracts remains widespread:
only 36 percent of private and 63 percent of foreign invested factories
in Guangdong sign contracts with workers.37
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Despotism and its critique on the shop £oors
Despotism on the shop £oors thrives on the institutional context of a
disorganized regulatory apparatus. The labor process in many indus-
trial ¢rms is marked by punitive disciplinary measures, intensi¢cation
of work, and `̀ £exible'' deployment of worker bodies and labor power.
Cloaked under the euphemistic slogan of `̀ scienti¢c management,''
these practices turn the shop £oor into a wellspring of class con£icts
and critical class consciousness, as workers ¢nd their material interests
compromised in di¡erent ways.
The widespread replacement of position wage and time wage by piece-
rate wage, in state factories under the planned economy, generated
intense con£icts and critique. The introduction of piece rate wages was
enthusiastically welcomed by workers in the early phase of reform
when state industries still enjoyed near monopoly over China's vast
consumer market. Yet, with unrelenting market competition from
township and village enterprises, private and joint-venture ¢rms in the
1990s, state ¢rms began to su¡er from slackened order and irregular
workloads. The piece-rate system of remuneration, which has previ-
ously brought about wage increases for workers, has turned into a tool
for management to reduce total wage bills when business contracts.
Together with the introduction of economic penalties for rejections
and violations of work disciplines like absenteeism and tardiness, the
new scienti¢c management system is ubiquitously condemned by state
workers as ``exploitative.'' For instance, one woman worker in a textile
mill criticized piece rate for rewarding only ``embodied labor,'' or labor
realized in tangible products. Her implicit point of reference was a past
system of time rate wage and position wage that rewarded workers for
their labor power, i.e., the sale of the appropriation of labor capacity.
She commented:
We don't get any wage for waiting time when we are forced to wait for raw
materials. Sometimes we come to the shop £oor at 7:30 a.m. and do prepara-
tory work until 11 a.m.We don't get paid if there is no output. In the past, we
were paid our basic wage rate during waiting hours or when machines broke
down.38
More than a few workers volunteered to comment on how they have
come to understand the notion of ``exploitation,'' a notion they have
registered passively in their minds through the years of state propaganda
about pre-revolutionary capitalist production. Seeing the elimination
of welfare and juxtaposing it to the past regime of enterprise paternal-
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ism have taught the female worker who comments below what exploi-
tation really means.
In the past, we had many welfare services. For female comrades, the most
important were the nursery, female sanitary room and sanitary napkins, the
mess hall, the shuttle, the barber shop.. . . I now understand what `̀ exploita-
tion'' really means. We workers are very pitiful now. In the past, no matter
how bad production became, if you needed housing, they (the enterprise
o¤cials) gave you a place to live. But for years, not one single apartment
building has been built in our unit.39
Demoralization plagues state enterprises when `̀ £exible'' production
takes the form of random assignment of work tasks, irregular work-
loads, and arbitrary dismissal. Skilled veteran workers, hailed in the
past as the technical backbone and progressive producers of their
enterprise, now complain vehemently about the degrading treatment
of being kicked around by managers who show no respect or need for
their technical skills. Veteran mechanics in both Guangdong and
Liaoning across a range of industries underscore the devalorization of
skill as many state-owned ¢rms struggle to survive by taking out-
processing jobs for non-state ¢rms. According to them, only speed,
not skills, matters.
I no longer know how my wage is calculated. They call it the con¢dential
wage system. In fact, it's a fuzzy wage system. We dare not ask .. . . But our
seniority does not count any more. A new worker gets paid as much as I do.
But if you ask him what size this screw is, he says he does not know. Still he
gets the same pay as I do, sometimes even more, if he comes back to take up
night shift. In the past, when I was an apprentice, I was paid grade one wage
until I proved that I had grade two skills and then I would be promoted,
gradually. Now, there is no skill distinction.We are just workers, and the boss
is the subcontractor. He has the power to assign you to whatever post he
likes, sweeping £oors or cleaning the bathroom.. . . Many migrant workers
are paid more than we are because they in the weaving department on piece
rate . . . . Recently he (the director) even dismissed one of my co-workers! I
always wonder if he has the legal power to dismiss state workers.40
Workers often characterize the shop £oor as antagonistic and con£ict
ridden. Meticulous rules for work procedures, ¢nancial penalties for
their violation, and overall dwindling of the paycheck trigger sponta-
neous work stoppages, goldbricking, and deliberate negligence. In one
of China's leading machinery plants in the northeast, a veteran worker
reports:
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We curse at work all the time because all of us are psychologically o¡-
balance (xinlibupingheng).Why should we care about quality anymore when
the director squanders away our money, having a good time with ladies in the
nightclubs or making a business trip to the United States? We deliberately
cast a blind eye on defective pieces passing down the assembly line. We say,
`̀ let them (£awed products) go.'' This is how we release some of our anger and
preserve our health.You know, these days we do not have medical allowances
anymore.41
Underlying state workers' indictments of oppression is a cognitive
framework of `̀ class,'' as shown in this worker's spirited critique of the
degeneration of the o¤cial union into a ``yellow union'' and the trans-
formation of enterprise cadres into a capitalist class:
Using the language of Lenin and Mao, our union is a yellow union. The
union chair is a running dog of the capitalist. He is just a dog! There is no
more meeting of theWorkers' Congress. In the past, when my child was sick
and we had money problems, I went to the union chair. He would study my
situations and then give me hardship allowances. Now nothing. Union only
cares about collecting dues, but giving back nothing .. . . When state enter-
prises allowed private subcontractors, cadres became capitalists. They now
all have cell phones and frequent nightclubs, no di¡erent from the capitalists.
In the old days, cadres came down to labor on the shop £oor with workers.42
Elsewhere in the more prosperous southern city of Guangzhou, state
workers likewise deploy Marxian concepts to understand and evaluate
market socialism. One worker condemns as unfair the unequal distri-
bution of income by appealing to Marx's labor theory of value:
Of course, this is not reasonable. Labor creates value. I don't believe one
should earn within one or two days what others have to spend a lifetime to
earn, like those star athletes . . . or a stamp that was sold for a million. Can
you tell me what kind of value they create?43
Workers' historical experiences of state socialism, and the discursive
and ideological frameworks constitutive of that political economy,
form the basis for interpreting the institutional changes brought about
by market reform as class exploitation. The e¡ects of such former
experiences of state socialism can be best illustrated by the di¡erent
reactions of migrant workers. Migrant peasant workers' encounter
with market and capitalist forces bring about a critique alluding to
`̀ alienation,'' grounded more in terms of denial of human dignity, loss
of personal autonomy, and dishonesty, not in terms of `̀ exploitation.''
Their indictment focuses less on the systemic or the institutional but
more on the individual and the bodily. In non-state ¢rms, piece rate
and the dire lack of welfare also prevail but discontents turn to manage-
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ment dishonesty and not the piece rate system per se or the exploitative
relation it embodies. Cheating by management takes the common
forms of concealing the rates of payment, discounting the volume of
worker outputs, and delaying and docking wages. These two workers'
accounts of the wage rate systems are typical in Guangzhou:
The boss never tells us the piece rates for di¡erent orders. He wants to
prevent workers from refusing to work. He would inform us the rates only
one month later, on our payday. By that time, we forget which rate is for
which job, and how many we have made. Usually, we (workers) know that we
should not work too fast, because the boss would cut the rate if we do.. . .44
Overtime work here should be paid 3 yuan per hour. But our own records of
overtime work are always di¡erent from the factory records. Their records
are always less than our own.. . . He (the manager) does not post any wage
scale.When he pays us, he only tells us the lump sum. He will not give us the
breakdown, like how much is basic wage, how much is overtime.. . . Usually,
he docks our wage for three months. So we get paid in December for the
work we did in September. Once, we refused to work in January because he
did not pay our September wage even after NewYear's Day.. . .45
Despotism also ¢nds expression in bodily degradation and deprivation
in£icted on workers during daily production routines. My ¢ndings in
non-state ¢rms concur with a number of academic and journalistic
reports that corporal punishment is frequently meted out to workers,
so much so that a common yardstick for workers to assess an enter-
prise as good or bad is whether `̀ the boss hits workers.'' Punishments in
the form of public kneeling, standing under the sun for long hours, or
incarceration inside the factory premises have become the staple of
management practices in private and East Asian invested ¢rms.46
Physical exhaustion generates a critique of `̀ inhumane'' managers
who transform workers into ``appendages of machines'' or outright
`̀ slaves of the boss'':
There is no ¢xed work schedule. A twelve-hour workday is minimum. With
rush orders, we have to work continuously for thirty hours or more. Day and
night . . . the longest shift we had worked nonstop lasted for forty hours . . . .
It's very exhausting, because we have to stand all the time, to straighten the
denim cloth by pulling. Our legs are always hurting. There is no place to sit
on the shop £oor. The machines do not stop during our lunch breaks. Three
workers in a group will just take turn to eat, one at a time.. . . The shop £oor
is ¢lled with thick dust. Our bodies become black working day and night
inside.When I get o¡ from work and spit, it's all black .. . . In the factory, your
entire body is under his (employer's) control. You lose control over yourself.
You have to do whatever he wants you to. It's like you're sold to him.47
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He (the boss) treats workers like machines. As long as we can earn him
money, he does not care about workers' health and body.. . . It's like in the
old society, I give you money and you become my slave, a lesser human being.
In the countryside, even if you are poor, people look down on you but still as
a human being.48
In short, I argue in this section that under disorganized despotism,
Chinese workers develop collective critical consciousness indicting
capitalistic management practices.Working class experience of reform
is heterogeneous, a prominent divide being that of state workers and
migrant workers, whose discontents are mediated by di¡erent idioms
and worldviews. The industrial workplace as a whole, however, has
turned into a wellspring of labor discontents. Yet, grievances are not
actions. To understand the motivational and mobilizational dynamics
of labor activism, we have to take a closer look at how these episodes
happened.
Work-unit mobilization
The absence of civil society and autonomous unions puts China in stark
contrast with Eastern European and Russian societies, the 1989Tianan-
men demonstrations notwithstanding. Recent studies of the pro-
democracy movement concur that the persistent lack of secondary
associations and lateral organizational structure have severely limited
the potential for either class-speci¢c or cross-class mobilization, even
in the opportune moment of elite cleavage. Mobilizations in 1989 turn
out to be dependent on ecology-based networks, a local nexus of
personal and friendship ties that are fostered within, and hence are
also segregated by, o¤cial organizations like work units, universities,
and student unions.49 This section argues that workers resist with the
organizational resources left by a retreating state socialism; `̀ work-unit
socialism'' 50 engenders work-unit insurgency under reform. When
market reform produces con£icts of interest between workers and
management, creating a class wedge within a work unit, worker mobi-
lization can build on pre-existing solidarity and shared interests
against cadres-turned-capitalists. And as the party and union cells
inside work units su¡er from institutional decay, more political space
is opened up in the interstices of everyday production life.Work stop-
pages like this one, which took place in a nationally renowned state-
owned enterprise in the northeast, have become quite commonplace.
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One afternoon (after two months of wage arrears), during lunch break, we
were very distressed.We were cursing and spilling out our anger while we ate.
Then, at the end of the lunch hour, all two hundred of us on the shop £oors
simply lost any motivation to resume work.We just stopped, spontaneously,
no need to organize (chuanlian), without any call from anyone, without any
leader. The shop £oor director learned about this and immediately came
down from his o¤ce. He began his thought education, explaining the di¤-
culties our enterprise was experiencing. After one hour, we resumed work. A
few days later, we got our paychecks.51
The erosion e¡ect of market reform on political control is most ob-
vious in crumbling state-owned enterprises. The northeast rust belt52 is
a prime example of concentrated bankruptcy, suspended and irregular
production, collective impoverishment and radicalization of workers.
By 1997, 56.4 percent of Liaoning's state-owned enterprises were o¤-
cially loss-making; 34.8 percent had an asset-debt ratio of over 100
percent and were de facto bankrupt ¢rms.53 Liaoning thus gains the
notorious fame of being the leading province of laid-o¡ workers: its 1.7
million unemployed workers accounted for 13.2 percent of the national
total in 1998. According to some estimates in internal documents, the
real rate of workers without job or pay varies from 30 percent to 40
percent.54 Due to the lack of market opportunities in this old industrial
base, even working-class family strategies of mutual help, income
pooling, and self-provisioning fall short. A 1997 survey on Liaoning's
unemployed families reveals that 41 percent of unemployed workers
had two or more family members who were also unemployed.55
Workers there have responded to their predicament by staging rail and
road blockages, sit-ins in front of government buildings, public peti-
tions, and demonstrations, some sustained for several years.56 Banners
and slogans announcing workers' outrage and desperation are telling:
`̀ Down with the Newly Emerging Nobility,'' `̀ Eradicate the New Bureau-
cratic Bourgeoisie,'' ``Workers are Masters of the State,'' ``Yes to Social-
ism, No to Capitalism,'' `̀ Long Live the Working Class,'' ` Àrrears
Guilty,'' ``Stop the Loss of State Assets,'' ``We Want to Work,'' and
`̀ We Want to Live.'' Steeped in the idioms of class and socialism, on
the one hand, and labor and subsistence rights (what workers called
`̀ shengcunquan ''), on the other, these public statements dramatically
summarize how far workers have been radicalized, in contrast to their
passivity under neo-traditionalism before the reform.
Most of these rallies and demonstrations were work-unit based. They
began typically with production suspension when workers were sent
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home for unspeci¢ed periods of long vacation. Management would
prepare for bankruptcy, described to workers as a scam and a strategy
to relieve the ¢rm of debt so that production could be resumed later.
Soon, when word spread about impending sales, or declaration of
bankruptcy by the court, workers began to petition, targeting ¢rst the
local government o¤ce, then the provincial and the central govern-
ments. When lives became more di¤cult, workers took more drastic
actions like sit-ins, blocking tra¤c, and staging public rallies. Sometimes
police would be sent to quell these revolts by use of violence and
detention of worker leaders. But local o¤cials are also wary of attract-
ing the attention of bureaucratic superiors in the provincial and central
governments who are insistent on social stability and clean govern-
ment. Thus, the politics of protest evolves around how much pressure
these actions can exert on local o¤cials to concede and negotiate with
workers, resulting in either workers' continuous and escalating protests
or o¤cials giving workers part of their unpaid wages or legal compen-
sation under the Bankruptcy Law or the regulations concerning laid-
o¡ workers. In the meantime, the central authority, riding on popular
discontent with local infraction of laws and corruption, has launched
waves of anti-fraud and anti-corruption campaigns.
The following is an account of a protest rally by workers in a window
frame factory, illustrating how a typical labor struggle unfolds.57 The
factory, with a workforce four-hundred strong, suspended production
in 1995 and workers were sent home without receiving livelihood
allowances as required by law. Having argued in vain with enterprise
management and the Economic Commission of the city government ^
the superior bureau overseeing the factory ^ workers gave up petition-
ing and focused instead on making ends meet. Then in April 1999, the
government announced that a real estate developer would buy the
factory premises for ¢ve million yuan and proposed an unemployment
compensation package to the Workers' Council.Workers went back to
attend the meeting and rejected the o¡er, demanding that either the
enterprise resume production or pay them severance compensation
pegged to the length of job tenure. In view of the imminent sale, and
the rumors that the local government would send in cranes and police
to clear the premises, workers living in the nearby enterprise housing
area began taking turns to guard the factory's main entrance. Some
twenty workers were there holding out day and night, with a red
banner hanging up at the gate, reading `̀ We vow to protect workers'
legal rights and interests'' and `̀ Stop the loss of state assets,'' both of
which were current o¤cial slogans. Then, a week later, on the night of
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June 24, at about 2 a.m., some ¢ve-hundred police o¤cers came with
dynamite, locked up the dozen workers guarding the premises and in
an hour's time demolished the several low-rise buildings making up the
factory. The noise awakened residents nearby, and angry workers living
further away gathered together early the next morning and began a
rally in the city, holding up white banners that said, `̀ We want to live''
and `̀ We demand justice.'' Wang Zhongzhi, an ordinary worker who
joined the protest in the ¢nal stage, recalled the chaos and workers'
explosive anger:
Every inch of grass and every piece of steel in the factory belonged to us
workers. They were our sweat and labor. People had tears in their eyes when
they saw the fallen pieces of window frames left on the burnt ground. Those
were state assets and these o¤cials just squandered them.. . . Two-hundred
workers gathered and everyone was agitated. There were so many di¡erent
calls to action: block the main highway, block the railroad, march to the
police department . . . . It was really an aimless £ow of people at that time,
marching forward not knowing where to go, just roaming. I shouted to
remind them to stay close together.We didn't want to lose any of them. But
frankly, I was very scared on the inside. Such a huge angry crowd.
It was a rainy day, and the rally crowd stopped several times under
bridges to rest and wait for the rain to stop. By 6 p.m., they arrived at
the last train station on the railway line to Shenyang. Under the
cautious eyes and occasional blocking by the police, they decided to
walk all the way to the provincial capital eighty kilometers away. By
that time, there were 140 people left and they stopped to spend the
night in a state-owned barn until daybreak. Around 2 a.m., the city
o¤cials came and wanted to negotiate on the spot. But workers said
they were too tired and would send representatives to meet with them
in the morning. At 5 a.m., all the major leaders of the city government
came, and to the workers' surprise, they appeared very sincere and
willing to talk about speci¢c compensations and regulations. The gov-
ernment o¡ered to `̀ buy o¡ their tenure'' at a rate of 400 yuan per year.
Aworker leader explained:
We accepted, because we knew the policy sets the range between 300 to 400
yuan per year. But workers did not trust their verbal promise and so we
demanded a written agreement. In the end, there were four clauses in black
and white. Three were about worker compensations and the last one was that
`̀ workers would never petition to higher level authorities.'' They (o¤cials)
were very afraid that we brought their dirty linen to the attention of their
superiors. There were so many illegitimate accounts inside the factory. . . .
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As in other cases, one ¢nds a common pattern in which workers claim
their legal rights as de¢ned by state policy, appropriating o¤cial slo-
gans for their banners. Geographical concentration of some workers
living in enterprise housing is critical in monitoring o¤cial actions.
Fearing that public attention would follow an escalation of the con-
frontation, and realizing that their actions deviated from central poli-
cies, local o¤cials were pressured to make concessions to workers'
demands.
The micro-mobilizational conditions facilitating protests like this have
much to do with varying accumulation of socialist era resources at the
enterprise level. Enterprises with property and marketable assets, and
those with their own enterprise compounds, are more protest prone.
Enterprise assets like a subsidiary shopping mall or factory premises in
good locations fuel worker expectations that they can claim their right-
ful ownership over these resources. Mass meetings among workers are
held in the courtyards of the enterprise residential quarter, consisting
of several seven-story apartment buildings in some cases. Smaller scale
meetings for the core leaders are held in their homes, which are all
within walking distance from each other. Donations and signatures
can be conveniently collected to ¢nance worker representatives to
travel to Shenyang, the provincial capital, and Beijing to petition.
Factories in the same city with more dispersed residential patterns see
their enterprise communities disintegrate once production is sus-
pended. Cross-work unit coordination is conspicuously absent in a
region teeming with worker demonstrations. A protest leader ex-
plained that workers consciously avoid such mobilization because
`̀ Our cause is just and legal. There is no need to associate (chuanlian)
with other units. The state will consider us rioting if we coordinate with
others.'' This comment reveals the moment when potentially explosive,
organized insurgency becomes channeled into the more time-consuming
and pacifying territory of the administrative system. In the face of real
and imminent danger of state repression, workers may ¢nd in their
faith in the e¤cacy of the law their most realistic resort. Arrest, beat-
ing, and detention of protesting workers have been reported, mostly
when there were signs of cross-unit mass participation.58 But the dy-
namics of collective mobilization do not always observe the boundary
of law and order, as the rally described above shows. If uncoordinated
activism is lacking in organizational prowess, its disruptive capacity
will always remain an uncertain threat defying systemic containment.
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Although market reform has also initiated a new generation of workers
into activism, migrant workers' factory-based strikes are usually less
sustainable episodes of resistance staged by some subgroups of work-
ers inside the ¢rm. More importantly, these struggles aim at immediate
economic compensation from employers without political engagement
with the state, local or central. For example:
Our boss as a rule docks our wage for one-and-a-half months, and we did not
have any say over this policy. Once, we waited for two more days beyond the
one-and-a-half-month period, and still no payment. In the morning of the
third day, in the dormitory, people just refused to get up to work. All stayed
in the dormitory, lying on our beds, talking light-heartedly about how the
boss would panic .. . . (Who organized this?) No one organized or led any-
thing. Just naturally and spontaneously, we just did not feel like going to
work. We wanted to give him pressure to pay us. Later in the day, he came
and asked us to return to work.We did not respond, and the next day, we got
our pay... . Strikes like this happened several more times when I was there.
Whenever he delayed our payment, we struck.59
Small groups of workers connected by native-place ties form the basis
for many of these collective actions. Most migrants have relied on
native place ties for their initial travel and sojourn at the beginning of
their migrant work career, and both academic and union studies have
underscored the role of native place solidarity in strike mobilization.60
One young migrant worker, who worked as a junior technician in a
state factory producing optical instruments, recalled a strike sparked
by allegedly discriminatory distribution of workload by the manage-
ment. A group of workers, all natives of Shaoqing working in the same
mechanics department, decided to stop working one afternoon and
just went back to rest in the dormitory. `̀ For several days, a dozen of
us just refused to come back to work. All were from our hometown
(Shaoqing). . . . We were not afraid, because there were so many of us,
and we have skills.We know that once away from home, we should be
prepared to hop from job to job.'' Management came to talk them into
resuming work the next day, and later the few worker leaders left for
another factory. Here as elsewhere, localistic networks are tenuous and
locals' mutual obligations often end with ¢nding a ¢rst job, with room
and board provided by the employer. The volatile labor market further
atomizes workers, dispersing locals and kin who might have begun
their migration together.
Brief and sudden outbursts of collective resistance like these are com-
monplace. The majority of migrant workers I interviewed in the study
have had personal experiences in one or more of such spontaneous
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acts of disobedience. Charles Sabel has observed more generally of
peasant labor's politics in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s: `̀At
¢rst a group of peasant workers may tolerate what it understands to be
breaches of the contract by the employer. But if abuse continues the
group reaches an unspoken consensus to su¡er no more. The peasant
workers are then likely to explode in rage at the slightest additional
provocation, belying in an instant their reputation for docility.'' 61 The
absence of independent unions and the ephemeral and mobile nature
of migrants' localistic networks, coupled with the staunch state repres-
sion of political association advocating the cause of workers in China,
prevent the emergence of labor movements among the massive migrant
workforce.62 Last but not least, even though they are all subject to the
same Labor Law, migrant workers' activism seldom involves making
claims against the state, local or central, re£ecting very di¡erent col-
lective perceptions of and experience with the state apparatus from
those of state workers.
Labor subjectivity: Comrade, class, or citizen?
Critical labor history has challenged the universal category of abstract
labor assumed in orthodox Marxian labor studies. Postcolonial
thought, for instance, opens up the possibility of another ``mode of
worlding'' among third-world laboring classes in societies without
`̀ liberal baggage,'' while feminist analyses point to the heterogeneity of
gendered labor subjects.63 What kind of working class subject emerges
under state socialism and postsocialism? State socialism does not
provide the bourgeois liberal order producing the juridical, individualist,
contract-based, citizen-like labor subject found in Marx and Marxian
theories of working class formation. Existing works on the socialist
working class either deny workers their subjecthood or fall back on
the proletarian subject embedded in a universalist and teleological
narrative of emancipation. For instance, Katherine Verdery argues
that state socialism (in Romania) produces a `̀ dependent'' subject
position `̀ rather than the agency cultivated by citizenship or the solid-
arity of ethnonationalism.'' 64 Burawoy and Lukäcs, on the other hand,
argue for an oppositional class consciousness against the state and
state socialism. Both the dependent subject of the state and the opposi-
tional class subject diverge from a third theoretical possibility, that of
Gramsci's notion of the proletariat as ``comrade'': `̀ Collaboration in
e¡ective and useful production develops solidarity and multiplies a¡ec-
tive bonds of a¡ection and fraternity . . . a joyous awareness of being an
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organic whole, a homogeneous and compact system which, through
useful work and the disinterested production of social wealth, asserts
its sovereignty, and realizes its power and its freedom to create his-
tory.'' 65 What is interesting in the Chinese situation today is that all
three subject-positions ^ class, comrade, and citizen ^ are articulated
one way or the other by Chinese workers, but with a distinct state-
centered orientation.
Marxist analysts have trenchantly argued that ideology both sub-
jugates and constitutes subjects, making actors recognize what exists,
what is good, and what is possible. The power of ideology works less as
texts or ideas possessed, but more as `̀ interpellation'' ^ a dialectical,
social process of subjection and quali¢cation. And although they ``be-
come quali¢ed by ideological interpellations, subjects also become
quali¢ed to `qualify' these in turn, in the sense of specifying them and
modifying their range of application.'' 66 If in the Maoist era, the state
absorbed the subaltern discourse of class struggle into state ideology,
under market socialism the repressed has returned with a vengeance. I
have already discussed how the class rhetoric of socialist propaganda
assumes moral and cognitive validity today as reform brings about
deteriorating livelihood and increasing oppression on the shop £oors.
Socialist concern in the past with the ``social question,'' or the attempt
to eliminate hierarchy and material inequality, is now appreciated
more than before. For instance, the power of the masses and the
egalitarian strains in the Maoist factory order, no matter how limited,
perfunctory and at times violent in the past, have become prominent
themes of mass nostalgia of socialism67 and of recognition of class
exploitation by cadres:
You must have heard this already. Everyone here (this enterprise) says this:
our lives would be so much better if there were still struggle meetings and
political campaigns. . . . Back then, we the masses had a weapon against
corrupt cadres. Many people miss mass campaigns. People always say these
cadres would have been criticized and executed many times over now for the
amount of their grafts.68
I really miss the time of Chairman Mao.We all got the same wage, 50 yuan.
At that time, there was no pain and no worry. Children got parents' jobs
when they graduated from school. Now, it's all capitalist.69
If `̀ class'' rhetoric makes critical subjects, the same happens to `̀ com-
radeship.'' The concept of `̀ comradeship'' was popularized after the
revolution to emphasize not only loyalty to Communism but also the
universal and fundamental equality among people in their role as
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fellow citizens under the state. Although the ethic of comradeship was
a tool of the state to intrude into, if not banish altogether, private
social relations (e.g., friendship) outside the purview of o¤cial surveil-
lance, it did create in Chinese society an ethos and expectation of
mutual help, commitment to the collective, and egalitarianism.70Today,
the loss of community and such ethos of mutual help is often men-
tioned, with workers lamenting the disappearance of home visits
(chuanmen) among co-workers and the decline of camaraderie and
helping behavior among people both in production and in public
places. Their nostalgia is not so much an unequivocal embrace of the
past but a considered reassessment of that history with the wisdom of
hindsight and in the light of current reform. For instance, when they
re£ect on their everyday production life, quite a few workers have
rediscovered the superiority of moral incentives over material ones:
We did not care about reward or pay.We simply had faith: the more di¤cult
the task, the harder we tried to accomplish it . . . . I am not saying that the
planned economy is good; I'm saying in Mao's time, `̀ Serve the people'' was a
reality.
Even during the hungry year of 1960, I did not complain, and went to work
every day religiously as usual. At that time, we had to do voluntary labor.
Perhaps because we were young, we were all high-spirited, without any
complaint, thinking that was our duty. My dad was the same. I saw him
working continuously for two weeks during the Great Leap, never came
home, and with no extra pay. At that time, earning 30 yuan was enough to
support a family. Eating out of one big pot may not be good for our country's
development, but spiritually and psychologically, people felt more balanced.
I ¢nd political campaigns disgusting, but at that time, interpersonal relations
were genuine and the social climate was pure and clean. Now, it's all about
money. That's when people became calculating and lax at work. It's after the
Cultural Revolution, when they began to give bonus. Workers refused to
work when there is too little bonus. And then con£icts also came with the
competition for bonus. Actually, money has side-e¡ects.71
The politics of collective memories have less to do with accurate re-
construction of reality than with the shared vision of history that
memories invoke, or the challenge memories pose against history.72
Narratives like these retrieve from history kernels of truth and achieve-
ment in Chinese socialism that workers have come to recognize and
miss.What is common in these subject positions of class and comrades
is the entrenched identi¢cation of workers with the state, or what they
repeatedly refer to as `̀ zhongyang,'' the central government, or simply
`̀ guojia,'' the nation-state. Even though workers are vehement in ac-
cusing enterprise managers and their conspirators in the local state
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bureaucracy as `̀ enemies of the people'' or `̀ worms'' in society, their
faith in the moral and political integrity of the central state remains
unwavering. Time and again, workers declare their conviction that
`̀ guojia'' will not allow all state enterprises to go down the tube or
that ``zhongyang '' has designed good policies to protect workers, that
the problem is local failure to implement them. This `̀ state-centered''
labor subjectivity has historical and institutional roots, as well as
empowering and self-limiting consequences for labor insurgency.
The intertwined history of state formation and class formation in
China, reinforced by an encompassing structure of organized depend-
ence binding workers to the state for four decades, has bestowed
complicated legacies on the collective mentality of Chinese workers.
Although Walder's fascinating analysis captures the institutional de-
pendence of workers on the state, his refugee interviewees and his
rational choice analytic might have led him to an oversimpli¢ed image
of workers as only utilitarian, interest-maximizing, individualistic par-
ticipants in the patron-client networks spun by the state. Workers in
my study tend to portray a more nuanced, contradictory, and ambiva-
lent movement between feelings of entrapment and solidarity.73 In-
deed, state workers in my study report genuine if also partly coerced
commitment to the revolutionary, nationalistic, and modernization
cause of the regime. When they recall how `̀ red-heartedly'' they
worked day and night during the Great Leap, living out the slogan of
`̀ our enterprise our home,'' without any demand for extra pay, they ¢nd
themselves to have been believers in the ideal of socialism and the
project of nation-building led by the Communist Party.74
Overtime work was the norm. Normally, we had half an hour of lunch time
and would turn o¡ the machines. But when campaigns came, we wanted to
overshoot the production target, say to ¢nish a yearly quota several days
earlier than planned, so we had to work extra hard. We gave up that half
hour and kept the machine running. We also extended our shift for a more
hour. . . . No one ever complained, everyone was the same.We looked at it as
our duty and for the good of the country. It's like when our enterprise ful¢lled
the quota, I felt it's my own honor too.. . . Now there are people who said our
pension and medical expenses are burdens to the state, but they do not see
that we were like cows ploughing new ¢elds. For years, we gave our blood
and sweat, and only received 40 yuan a month. The rest was saved up in the
state.We are only drawing on our own savings today.75
Workers are not oblivious to the fact that the Chinese party-state
brought the working class into being by launching large-scale industri-
alization after the revolution and actually guaranteed them a secure
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and stable livelihood and relatively high political status. Compared to
the massive peasantry, urban workers in the state sector formed a
privileged `̀ labor aristocracy,'' enjoying a real rise in levels of wage and
food consumption throughout the pre-reform period, not to mention
job security, training and educational opportunities, and welfare bene-
¢ts.76 One indication of how deep the state has penetrated worker
subjectivity is the way they construct their life history. In these person-
al accounts, biographical time (life course events like graduation from
high school, marriage, and childbirth) is often remembered and expe-
rienced as national time (political campaigns or state policy initia-
tives). Yet, rather than being alienated by such ``etatization of time''
and experiencing it as immobilizing persons, eroding sociability and
religious community, or ruining national character, as KatherineVerdery
has pointed out in Romania,77 Chinese workers imbue that history
with nationalistic meanings. Exactly because of this sense of having
contributed to national development, being `̀ let go'' collectively by
their enterprise triggers a moral indictment of state betrayal:
Our generation has really su¡ered a bad fate. As kids, when we were growing,
[there was not enough food as] it happened to be the Three Di¤cult Years.
When we were in primary and secondary school, it was the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Then, at 17, we were made to leave our parents to go up to the moun-
tains or down to the ¢elds. Just when we were back to the city, there was the
`̀ diploma craze.'' Now, at our age, with neither strength nor skill, we become
the ¢rst target of reform [and are rendered] unemployed and redundant.78
In short, instead of an `̀ us versus them'' model found more often in
externally-imposed state socialism, a mutually constitutive historical
experience underlies the relation of the Chinese state to the Chinese
state workers. For the latter, the state has been and should be the
guardian of national and collective interest, justice, basic needs, and
development. Such envisioning is empowering to the extent that work-
ers hold the state responsible and are emboldened morally and politi-
cally to appeal to it ^ based on their contributions in the past ^ when
state policies are violated at the local level. The same collective sub-
jectivity, however, also imposes limits on how far workers go in claim-
ing their interests and rights: state policies and the law are the limits
beyond which they do not want or dare to tread. Hence, insurgency
and its containment by the state's discourse of legality.
In the reform period when the state promotes socialist legality and
declares a series of regulations and policies targeting state workers,
workers graft onto the spirit of the law and frame their demands in a
216
rhetoric of legal rights. In a protracted three-year labor struggle in the
northeast against the local authorities regarding the bankruptcy pro-
cedure of a textile mill, workers were adamant in their legalistic claims.
Every time the central government announced on television new regu-
lations guaranteeing livelihood allowances for state workers or re-
employment arrangements, workers would organize petitions in the
Mayor's o¤ce. A typical petition letter these workers presented to the
city, provincial, and central governments re£ected thorough knowledge
of speci¢c clauses in the Bankruptcy Law or the policy of minimum
livelihood guarantee. Here is an example:
With our deepest indignation and a strong sense of responsibility towards the
Party, the enterprise and ourselves, we the entire workforce had sustained a
hundred days of petition to the city government, demanding thorough inves-
tigation into the handling of bankruptcy of our enterprise. There was never
any satisfactory reply. Therefore, following the stipulations of the Petition
Regulations, we submit this jointly signed petition to you the Provincial
Government . . . . Here are the discrepancies between the Bankruptcy Law
and the situations of our enterprise. First, the procedure of the bankruptcy
was illegal. According to ``Instructions on Bankruptcy of State Owned Enter-
prises'' passed by the Liaoning People's Government O¤ce .. . there must be
approval by the Workers' Congress . . . . None of this is true in our case.
Second, workers received absolutely no livelihood allowance and this is a
violation of Clause Four in the Bankruptcy Law.. . .
Subjectivity of migrant workers is much less state-oriented. In describ-
ing their present work conditions or future plans, they seldom invoke
the state or the central government, which seem amorphous and dis-
tant. For the minority of migrant workers who have experience inter-
acting with local labor bureau o¤cials or public security o¤cers, the
state is predatory and discriminatory against their sort. But even these
younger workers, whose worldview and `̀ career at work'' 79 are almost
always more rooted in the rural society and oriented to the prospect of
returning to the countryside, show signs of turning to the law, although
on a more individual basis. In Shenzhen, Guangdong, for instance,
increases in industrial injuries and the subsequent lawsuits ¢led by
migrant workers and their lawyers indicate a gradual popularization
of legal rights consciousness. Interviews with injured workers reveal
how bodily trauma entailing the permanent loss of labor power often
triggers a process, ¢rst of negotiation with employers for compensa-
tion on the ground of compassion and justice, and then of a search for
legal resolution involving the local and then the higher level state
judiciary.80
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The strategic deployment of a language of legality and rights does not
imply that workers attain the status and consciousness of ``citizenship''
a© la western liberal democracy. It means, however, that they struggle to
perform and thus realize a legal status, bestowed by the central govern-
ment's law and regulations but denied them by local state agents.
Riding on the ideology of legality, they bolster their bargaining power
and legitimate their public activism in defense of their material inter-
ests. This is a site of insurgency, not revolution, where one ¢nds a
conservative tendency to accept as legitimate the existing order (cen-
tral state power remains unchallenged) but also a radical one of practi-
cally transforming one's conditions of existence given new institutional
resources. Finally, although the labor subject of such insurgency (at
least the one by state workers) fuses identities of class, comradeship,
and citizenship, all in the context of a strong statist orientation, that
subjectivity is no less political or potent.
Conclusion
In this article, I have tried to specify the concrete social processes and
institutional mechanisms leading to labor insurgency in postsocialist
China. To explore the theoretical payo¡ of an analysis of the Chinese
experience, I frame it as a series of anomalies vis-a© -vis the thesis of the
`̀ revolutionary socialist worker'' grounded in production politics in
other state socialist transitions. My overall argument is that the pas-
sage of state socialism, not state socialism per se, o¡ers the potential
for labor radicalization in terms of critical consciousness and mobili-
zational capacity. First, the state attempts to rebuild legitimacy
through a ``rule by law,'' but this remains abortive due to collusion
between local o¤cials and enterprise owners. Second, disorganized
reform fosters the emergence of despotism at the point of production,
which seriously compromises workers' material interests and their
standard of justice. Worker mobilization is thus fueled by survival
needs and moral outrage, their demands incited and channeled by the
state's discourse of legality and citizen rights. Interestingly, worker
solidarity is also partially founded on collective memories of Maoist
socialism and its class rhetoric. Among veteran workers in declining
industries in rust-belt regions bereft of the much touted but ever elusive
market opportunities, the propensity to stage mobilization targeting
the state is particularly prominent. I have found that even in the
absence of civil society associations or broad-based social movement
unionism, market reform creates collective losers forging locality-
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based, work-unit activism. The Chinese material also indicates that
postsocialist labor insurgency does not imply the total rejection of
state socialism or passive embrace of the market. State workers' polit-
ical aspirations challenge the state to retain its self-proclaimed role as
the guardian of universal interest and to safeguard the socialist ideal of
securing a basic livelihood for all, even under a market-driven econo-
my. This statist orientation has roots in institutional and moral rela-
tions between the state and the working class under state socialism.
But it also has to do with the quite unique capacity of the Chinese
party-state to remain intact under postsocialism, when it also pro-
motes accumulation and incubates market mechanisms.81 Therefore,
one can expect that as long as the state monopolizes political power,
worker struggles will also tend to enlist state involvement, thus gener-
ating a precarious mode of political stability.82
Through tracing some of the dynamics of labor radicalization under
postsocialism, I also want to underline its limits and openness. One
reading of the above analysis casts doubt on the political potential of
such patterns of working class insurgency. After all, the most restive
workers are those in declining industries and bankrupt state enter-
prises, and their radicalism occurs at the moment of exit from the
working class, i.e., when they become unemployed, thus permanently
losing their status as `̀ worker.'' In other words, the Chinese working
class is made only at the moment when it is unmade by reform! With
time, and without sustained organization, such localized, enterprise-
based labor insurgency will lose steam as workers become more de-
moralized and unemployment is normalized. In addition, unrelenting
state repression against any form of organized dissent, coupled with
the entrenched exclusionary elitism of the Chinese intellectuals, makes
cross-class social movement a© la Polish Solidarity an unlikely outcome
of Chinese reform.83
But there is potential for an alternative scenario. Because postsocialist
labor politics fuses class solidarity with claims for workers as citizens
with legal rights, it can galvanize broader political resonance. There
are already clear signs that peasants are increasingly using the rhetoric
of law and legal rights in their protests, rallying around policy slogans
promulgated by the central government in their struggles against local
level taxation and corruption.84 The convergence of unorganized popu-
lar activist groups that share similar cognitive repertoires, and perhaps
institutional targets (local state o¤cials) as well, can be politically
unsettling. Sociologists have noted the powerful political impact in
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state socialist systems of the `̀ large numbers'' phenomenon: the cen-
tralization of power and uniformity of social institutions creates large
number of individuals with similar behavioral patterns, interests, and
demands targeting the state. In China, widespread but uncoordinated
collective action (or inaction) by peasants and rural cadres, for in-
stance, has even vetoed or shaped state policies as fundmental as the
de-collectivization of agriculture.85 The same political potential ap-
plies to the postsocialist period and to the mode of locality-based labor
radicalization analyzed in this article, not the least because such agi-
tation dovetails with the central government interest in establishing a
robust regulatory state apparatus based on rule by law. As one looks
ahead at China's further integration into global capitalism, formally
marked by its accession to the World Trade Organization, worsening
urban and rural unemployment and intensi¢ed labor insurgency loom
large in the horizon. Can the government manage to keep at bay the
eruption of a large number of local protests by doling out emergency
subsistence funds and launching anti-corruption campaigns? Or will
the politics of legal activism initiate a process of nurturing society's
self-organizing capacity so much that more sustainable e¡orts emerge
as part of society's demands for citizen's legal rights? In any case, the
irony is that rather than the entrepreneurs or the rising middle classes,
whose interests reside in evading the law rather than promoting it, it is
the popular classes, viz., workers and peasants, who champion the
cause of `̀ bourgeois'' legal rights!86 In short, the demise of state social-
ism is compatible with a wide range of political outcomes.87 Scholars
of Chinese politics who focus on the new middle classes or the local
state elite have respectively postulated the rise of `̀ civil society,'' 88
`̀ corporatism,'' 89 ``symbiotic clientelism,'' 90 and ``local state corpora-
tism'' 91 as the possible directions of Chinese political development.
Taking an alternative perspective and looking at one massive group of
losers produced by market reform, this article suggests an alternative
path of political change. Legal activism, and the concomitant and
simultaneous rise in class and citizen consciousness, whether collective
or individual, may chart a signi¢cant course of political development
under market reform.
Finally, I have tried in this analysis to restore a critical perspective on
the limits of reforms by excavating labor's standpoint and experience
in the reform process. Many of the most in£uential studies of Chinese
reform have o¡ered us insightful analyses of institutional and organi-
zational changes prompting high growth rates in the Chinese economy.
At the same time, a ``metaphysical pathos'' celebrating the Chinese
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experience as a historical success story underlies many of these studies.
But it is an optimism that £ies in the face of working-class realities.
The latter reveal a world of deepening class con£icts, moral confusion,
economic dislocation, and decay. I do not suggest that the standpoint
of labor is a privileged one, o¡ering a more comprehensive or a ``truer''
view of reality than that of the bourgeoisie or the state. Yet, it is an
opportunity for critical knowledge, based on workers' objective struc-
tural location in society and their practical engagement with those
local realities. Living through two historical alternatives, i.e., state
socialism and postsocialism, generates a sense of historicity of the
current social order, and the contradictions between appearance and
reality. Workers' collective nostalgia of certain aspects of the Maoist
past (e.g., moral incentives, more egalitarian shop £oor, camaraderie,
revolutionary idealism, mass participation in national development)
coexists with critique of the more tyrannical and dehumanizing aspects
of that past history. This present analysis selects only those elements of
their mentality that focus on what they consider lost achievements of
socialism. Workers' lived experience under reform also points to the
gap between the appearance and reality of a market driven society. In
contrast to the pervasive neo-liberal ideology celebrating the ration-
ality of the market, workers have found that opportunity, prosperity,
freedom and legality are limited, elusive, and uneven in their avail-
ability. This embedded critical perspective can be a departure for
understanding postsocialist society and for constructing postsocialist
theory. At least, it sensitizes us to an alternative agenda of inquiry to
that of `̀ neoclassical sociology,'' characterized by an emphasis on stra-
tegic action in the deployment of capital, property forms, elite circu-
lation, and optimistic assessments of the potentialities of capitalism as
the end of history.92 What this latter research program, including the
most prominent works on the Chinese transition, has downplayed and
what this article only begins to address instead is the dialectical inter-
play of elite and subaltern transformation, market formation and class
formation, institution building and popular resistance, economics and
politics.
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City Hall,'' South China Morning Post, May 17, 2000; `̀ Crumbling Northeast
Industry Breeds Despair,'' South China Morning Post, June 13, 2000.
57. I collected data on this and other protests in the summer of 1999 and winter of 2000
in Liaoning. I have reported this case together with two others in `̀ The `Revenge of
History': Collective Memories and Labor Protests in Northeastern China,'' Ethno-
graphy 1/2 (2000): 217^237. See also, Chen Feng, `̀ Subsistence Crisis, Management
Corruption and Labour Protests in China,'' The China Journal 2001.
58. International media have reported incidents of armed police, even armies, being
sent in to arrest protesters or using force to clear blockage of highways and rail-
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